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Information Management System for Mine 
Action 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The 1996-2006 civil war between the Government of Nepal (GoN) and communist rebels left 
Nepal with a modest but widespread amount of contamination from landmines, explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) and improvised explosives devices (IED). In addition, there were 
significant stockpiles of IED, much of which rebel combatants were to assemble near to their 
cantonment areas as stipulated in the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA). 
Among its other mandates, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was asked to inventory these IED 
stockpiles and to support their destruction. This initiative was financed principally through the 
UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN). 
 
The CPA also required the Nepal Army to mark and ‘excavate’ its anti-personnel minefields and 
IED fields within 60 days. It did not have the training or equipment to do this and turned to the 
UN plus some bilateral donors for assistance. Working under UNMIN, the UN Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) initially arranged for training in minefield survey and clearance, explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) and IED disposal. In addition, building on its earlier work with local and 
international civil society (NGOs plus the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement) to support mine 
risk education (MRE) and the surveillance of mine/IED casualties, UNICEF was quick to provide 
14,000 hazards signs so both the Army and rebels could make their mine/IED fields.  
 
On its side, the Government of Nepal (GoN) established the Nepal Army Mine Action 
Coordination Centre (NAMACC) in late 2006 and, six months later, the inter-ministerial Mine 
Action Steering Committee and a Mine Action Technical Committee, both reporting via the new 
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR). Initially, these committees remained inactive, 
due in part to the difficulties the country’s political parties experienced in forming a stable 
government and implementing the more contentious provisions of the CPA. 
 
The UN mine action programme expanded when responsibility for mine action was transferred 
from UNMIN to the UN Country Team in late 2008. Within two months, the UN Mine Action 
Team (UNMAT) and the Army agreed on a joint capacity development plan for NAMCC. This 
envisaged an expansion in the Army’s capacity for ‘humanitarian demining’1 to four platoons, 
each working in accord with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).  
 
UN support to mine action again expanded in scale and scope in mid-2009 when the UNMAT 
received funding for (i) development of a mine action section within the MoPR, (ii) MRE, (iii) 
Victim Assistance, and (iv) development of quality management capacity within MoPR, as well 
as coordination of mine action activities and information plus attendance by MoPR personnel at 
international mine action events. In November 2009 a joint taskforce under the leadership of an 
Under Secretary at MoPR produced a Plan of Action for Mine Action. 
 
                                                            
1
 In mine action, ‘humanitarian’ generally means activities undertaken for the benefit of the general community, and 
not for military or purely commercial purposes. 
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This envisaged that the MoPR would house the national Mine Action Centre,
2
 with the capacity 
to (among other things): 
• Coordinate and make decisions regarding implementation of Mine Action activities  
• Mobilise required resources  
• Manage the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database  
• Manage QA/QC of cleared sites  
• Manage National Guidelines for Safety Standards (NGSS) 
 
Among the objectives in the taskforce report was “Nepal to sign APMBT [i.e. the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)] within a realistic timeframe as determined by the Government 
of Nepal.” 
 
Progress in developing capacities within MoPR was far less rapid or substantial than with 
NAMACC. The MoPR does serve as the conduit for funding of mine action from the Nepal Peace 
Trust Fund (NPTF) – a joint GoN-donor mechanism designed to help finance the implementation 
of CPA provisions.
3
 However, the Mine Action Section within the Ministry remained under-
resourced and weak. Responsibility for information management and quality management 
remained with the Army rather than the MoPR.  
 
The national Steering Committee (the NMAA) also has been weak. A draft national mine action 
strategy was completed in February 2011 and approved by the Technical Committee, but it has 
not been adopted by the Steering Committee. Similarly, National Technical Standards and 
Guidelines (NTSG) were prepared in July 2010 and adopted by the Technical Committee, but the 
Steering Committee did not meet to adopt these until March 2012. Mine action legislation was 
not even drafted.  
 
In addition, although not listed explicitly as an objective in the UN project documents, it is clear 
the UN agencies involved (UNCT, UNMAS, UNICEF) devoted significant efforts to having Nepal 
sign the Ottawa Convention through discussions in Nepal, facilitating the attendance of 
Nepalese officials in international meetings on the Convention, and trying to facilitate a high-
level mission by Prince Mired of Jordan – one of the champions of universalization. The GoN 
backed away from its initial agreement to the visit by Prince Mired and has not signed the 
Ottawa Convention or the other main conventional weapons disarmament instruments.
                                                            
2
 The typical functional responsibilities of a national MAC are outlined in IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of 
a national mine action programme, available from www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-
english/list-of-imas/  
3
 See http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00067441. NPTF funding for mine action goes largely to the 
Department of Education, which provides mine risk education in the schools. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Nepal is a landlocked country situated between China and India. Just over 147,000 sq km in size, 
Nepal is divided into three main geographic zones: the “Terai” or flat river plain of the Ganges in 
the south; a central hill region; and the rugged Himalaya mountains in north. Its 30 million 
people are divided on ethnic, language and caste lines. Nepal’s political and, to an extent, 
economic difficulties stem largely from social exclusion and motivated the 1996-2006 civil war. 
Exclusion continues in spite of constitutional provisions stipulating equality.
4
 
 
Textbox 1 – Nepal’s Civil War 
The Civil War was launched in February 1996 by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – 
CPN(M). The stated aim was the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a 
People’s Republic. The conflict claimed an estimated 15,000 lives and displaced up to 10 times 
that number. 
 
Initially the Royal Nepal Army refused to be drawn into the insurgency, regarding it as an 
internal policing matter. However, following the breakdown of peace talks in 2001 and 
subsequent attacks by rebels on the army, the Army responded and the conflict escalated. 
 
Frustrated by the inability of the government to defeat the rebels, in February 2005 King 
Gyanendra assumed direct control of power. This led to a united front between the CPN(M) and 
other anti-monarchy parties, followed by a general strike and demonstrations in Kathmandu 
that forced the King to reinstate Parliament and accept a ceremonial role.
5
 Both sides then 
announced ceasefires and entered peace negotiations, which culminated in the Comprehensive 
Peace Accord signed on 21 November 2006 by the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the Maoists.  
 
Political difficulties have continued in spite of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and the 
April 2008 election of a Constituent Assembly. Between 2008 and 2011 there were four 
different coalition governments.  
 
Textbox 2 – The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and the UN Mission in Nepal 
In addition to a complete cessation of hostilities, the parties to the CPA agreed on: 
• the election of a Constituent Assembly 
• stripping the King of political authority and nationalising royal property  
• addressing social exclusion and eliminating the feudal system of land holdings 
• forming a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission, a Truth Commission, and a 
high-level Commission for State Restructuring 
                                                            
4
 This declares that all citizens are “equal irrespective of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe or ideology” but also 
protects “traditional practices” that open the door to discrimination and exclusion. See World Bank and DFID, 
Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal, 2006 
5
 In 2008, the Constituent Assembly abolished the monarchy. 
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• rehabilitation and social integration of people displaced during the insurgency 
• Management of Arms and Armies provisions, including:6 
o cantonment of the Maoist forces in seven locations plus three satellite 
cantonments, with verification and monitoring to be provided by the UN 
o confinement of the Nepal Army (NA) to barracks7 
o locked storage of Maoist arms and ammunition – plus an equal amount by the 
NA – to be monitored by the UN 
 
On 23 January 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1740 established the United Nations 
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as a political mission
8
 to monitor the AMMAA, assist in the 
registration of combatants and their weapons, monitor the NA and CPA arrangements, provide 
support for the election of a Constituent Assembly and monitor the electoral process. 
 
Armed violence incidents and casualties dropped significantly following the CPA, but continued 
violence by non-state armed groups, especially in the Terai region, has led to new use of 
improvised explosive devices (IED) and to new victims.  
 
Textbox 3 – The emergence of non-state armed groups in the Terai
9
 
The Terai comprises 20 districts along the southern border with India. It contains about half of 
Nepal’s 30 million people and is often sub-divided into the plains (Madhesi) and the hill region 
(Pahadi). Madhesi activists want a single, powerful province with greater autonomy or outright 
secession. This leads to conflicts with groups in the region who do not want to be subsumed 
into a Madhesi-dominated province. 
 
Madhesi grievances led to a mass protest movement in January 2007 (the Andolan), which led 
to violence against Pahadi communities, a surge of extortion against Pahadi families and threats 
to human rights workers. Non-state armed groups have emerged claiming to represent various 
ethnic and regional groups and sustaining themselves by extortion and other criminal activities. 
 
Politically, Nepal still faces many challenges. Many of the provisions of the CPA remain un-
implemented due to political rivalries. This has led to numerous and rapid cabinet changes and, 
at times, political gridlock. For example, the study team learned there have been at least nine 
different Ministers of Peace and Reconstruction since that Ministry was established in 2007. 
This is the Ministry that, supposedly, is responsible for mine action and the Minister is the Chair 
of the National Mine Action Steering Committee, which has rarely met. In such an environment, 
it is difficult to sustain issues such as mine action on the political agenda for long enough to 
resolve them. 
 
The process of drafting a new Constitution appears to have exhausted the main political parties 
and the deadline has had to be extended a number of times. Agreement on a Constitution will 
require compromises on a range of contentious issues, including: federalism, the number of 
                                                            
6
 These provisions were augmented by an Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies 
(AMMAA) signed by the Government and the CPN(M) and witnessed by the UN on 28 Nov 2006. 
7
 However, the Army would continue to provide border security and protect strategic installations, etc. 
8
 This means UNMIN was a peacekeeping mission without peacekeeping forces. 
9
 Taken largely from Saferworld et al, Armed Violence in the Terai, Aug 2011. 
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provinces and the amount of power decentralised to them; the roles and authorities of the 
executive relative to parliament; and protections against discrimination on the basis of ethnic, 
caste or regional identity. 
 
Nepal remains a very poor country with a per capita income of USD 1,160,10 and ranking 157th of 
187 countries on the Human Development Index. Remarkably, during the civil war poverty levels 
fell from 42 per cent to 31 per cent in the eight years to 2003/04. This was driven largely by an 
increase in remittances from Nepalese working abroad (from 3 per cent of GDP to 12 per cent), 
but other contributing factors included rising agricultural wages, the expansion of roads and 
telecommunications, urbanisation and a fall in the dependency ratio due to a decline in fertility 
rates. 
PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS 
In February 2007, the GoN – with support from some development partners – set-up the Nepal 
Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) to support the implementation of the CPA and related agreements. 
That same month, a donor group agreed a Joint Financing Arrangement with the GoN for 
support to the NPTF.
11
 These two pooled-funding arrangements proved to be important to the 
success of mine action in the country. 
 
Textbox 4 – Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) 
The NPTF had an original mandate to support the GoN in implementing the following key 
provisions from the CPA: 
• Management of camps and reintegration of former combatants 
• Rehabilitation of Internally Displaced People  
• Election of the Constituent Assembly  
• Strengthening law and order and police administration 
• Support to the peace process 
 
Subsequently, the mandate was expanded to include: 
Rehabilitation of conflict-affected people 
Mine action  
Reconstruction of public sector infrastructure damaged during the conflict 
 
These activities are grouped into four clusters, each of which incorporates some reconstruction 
of infrastructure: 
Cluster 1:  Cantonment Management and Rehabilitation of Combatants 
Cluster 2:  Conflict Affected People and Communities 
Cluster 3:  Security and Transitional Justice (which now includes mine action) 
Cluster 4:  Constituent Assembly and Peace Building Initiatives (National and Local) 
 
The NPTF is overseen by a Board of Directors, chaired by the Minister for Peace and 
Reconstruction, with the MoPR Secretary as member-secretary. The Board represents a broad 
                                                            
10
 In Purchasing Power Parity terms. 
11
 In 2009, the Board invited a representative from the main Maoist party – now called the Unified Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist) – as an observer to counter the perception that the main instrument for implementing the CPA was 
in the hands of one of the parties to the CPA. 
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political spectrum of stakeholders in the peace and transformation process and has 
responsibility for the strategic direction of the fund. The Fund is administered by a Peace Fund 
Secretariat (PFS) headed by a Joint Secretary of the MoPR, who is designated by the Ministry as 
the Director of the NPTF.  
 
In Phase 1 (2007-2010), just over USD 104 million was contributed to the NPTF from the GoN 
(62 per cent) and donors (38 per cent). Phase 2 (also planned for three years) started in January 
2010.  
 
In April 2007, the GoN established the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR)
12
 with a 
mandate to support peace-building efforts and reconstruction projects specifically focused in 
areas and on populations most affected by the conflict. MoPR serves as the main 
implementation mechanism for the NPTF and, therefore, the CPA. 
 
With the NPTF in place to finance Government activities to implement the CPA, in March 2007 
the UN established a complementary mechanism – the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) – to 
finance peace-building activities by the UN system. This was targeted to actions for which the 
UN had a comparative advantage due to, for example:13 
• as an ‘impartial third party’, the UN is able to address issues that are too politically 
sensitive for national actors 
• providing specialized (‘boutique’) expertise that does not exist in Nepal 
• importing institutional capacity from existing UN programmes to reduce the need for 
national investments in institutional development a short-term peace-building nature 
• leveraging additional financing from global and regional funding instruments  
 
Textbox 5 – the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) 
The UNPFN supports activities in four main areas, similar to the four clusters of the NPTF –
cantonments/reintegration activities; elections/governance; security; and rights and 
reconciliation – as well as for ‘Quick Impact Projects’. It has common governance arrangements 
to those of the NPTF: overall guidance by the NPTF Board, in consultation with the Donor Group 
(DG) and instructions from its Executive Committee (chaired by RC/HC14 with one representative 
each from MoPR and the DG).  
 
The governance structures of the two Funds are depicted below. 
 
To 31 December 2010 the UNPFN had received USD 32.27 million in earmarked and non-
earmarked donations. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)
15
 was the largest 
contributor (31 USD), just ahead of the U.K. (29 per cent) and Norway (25 per cent). 
 
                                                            
12
 This, essentially, replaced the Peace and Rehabilitation Commission agreed in the CPA. 
13
 A more complete list is provided in the Independent External Review of the UNPFN, p. 24. 
14
 The UNFPN originally came under UNMIN but, in January 2009, management of the Fund came under the Resident 
Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC). 
15
 UN PBF is a multi-year fund for post-conflict peace-building, “with the objective of ensuring the immediate release 
of resources needed to launch peace-building activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery.” It is 
supported by 50 donors and development agencies. 
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In addition to these ‘basket’ funding arrangements with their overlapping governance 
structures, other donors and the World Bank launched separate projects to support the 
implementation of the CPA. In most cases, the MoPR is the responsible ministry. 
 
Textbox 6 – The World Bank’s Emergency Peace Support Project (EPSP) 
In May 2008, the World Bank approved a USD 50 million grant for an Emergency Peace Support 
Project (EPSP). Originally designed to finance cash payments to Maoist militia in the 
cantonments and to conflict-affected people in the following categories: 
• widows • Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 
• families of the deceased • those abducted 
• families of the disappeared • orphans 
• the disabled  
 
In 2010 the project was substantially restructured. The plan to provide Maoist ex-combatants 
was dropped and replaced by new component designed to finance “skills and employability 
rehabilitation services” for conflict-affected people.16 
 
                                                            
16
 This was due to “management concerns that the monthly payments made to Maoist ex-combatants … might have 
been misused in a manner inconsistent with the project objective of consolidation of the peace process.” Therefore, 
the GoN budget absorbed these payments and the $18.55 million in the EPSP budgeted for payments to ex-
combatants was reprogrammed. 
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Therefore, by mid-2008, three large mechanisms were in place that eventually mobilised about 
USD 185 million in support of the implementation of the CPA – mainly via or in cooperation with 
the MoPR. 
 
Figure 1 – Financing the Implementation of the CPA 
 
LANDMINE AND OTHER ERW CONTAMINATION 
During the conflict, the Nepal Army (NA) used anti-personnel mines (AP mines), as well as IED, 
around military installations, police posts and infrastructure. The NA stated that it started using 
mines in 2002 and deployed an estimated 14,000 AP mines in 53 locations. The NA deployed 
mines in most locations in accordance with military doctrine, and mapped and recorded 43 out 
of the 53 minefields.  
 
In addition to AP mines the NA, Armed Police Force (APF)17 and Nepal Police (NP) deployed 
command detonated IEDs. The NA used such devices in 275 locations. The APF reportedly 
deployed command-detonated IEDs in 200 locations and the Nepal Police in another 47 
locations. As well, Army use of mortars and other projectiles resulted in limited contamination 
from unexploded ordnance (UXO). The difficult and often inaccessible terrain would be a 
complicating factor for demining.  
 
                                                            
17
 This was created by the Government in 2001 in response to the insurgency. 
$50 million 
Donors Govt. of Nepal World Bank 
UN Peace Fund 
for Nepal 
Nepal Peace 
Trust Fund 
Emergency 
Peace Support 
Project 
UN agencies 
supporting GoN 
Ministry of Peace 
& Reconstruction Cooperation 
$32 million 
$64 million $40 million $50 million 
$32 million 
$104 million 
$50 million 
Government 
Departments 
Government 
Departments 
Government 
Departments 
Ministry of 
Finance 
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The Maoists had limited access to commercially manufactured arms and instead resorted to the 
manufacture of IED. The most common device was a “socket bomb” (improvised hand 
grenades) crafted from plumbing joints.  Bombs were also made from pipe, buckets, pressure 
cookers etc. The fusing mechanisms of these devices were often unreliable and affected by 
environmental conditions.  
 
Figure 2 – Location of minefields 
  
Together, this 
contamination from 
NA, APF, NP and 
Maoist use of 
explosive devices 
created moderate 
but widespread 
contamination. Data 
from the Informal 
Sector Services 
Centre (INSEC) 
showed that 
accidents took place in 60 of the 75 districts in Nepal in the 2004-2006 period, with most 
accidents the result of IEDs. 
  
Textbox 7 – Informal Sector Services Centre (INSEC) 
Established in 1988 as the Informal Sector Research Centre, in 1990 INSEC started a human 
rights programme with a network of representatives in each of Nepal’s 75 districts. INSEC began 
working with UNICEF in 2005 to monitor the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The following 
year it was approached by Handicap International (HI) and UNICEF to establish an ‘active’ 
surveillance system for victim-activated explosions and casualties.
18
 
 
Whenever an explosion affecting civilians occurs, INSEC sends a representative to investigate. 
Data collected at the district level, usually from the survivor, relatives or witnesses of the 
accident, is sent to INSEC Regional and Central Offices, and then transferred to victim assistance 
agencies and other members of the mine action community. Data are entered into a database 
(an Excel workbook).  
 
After each incident, a ‘flash report’ which updates the overall injury data and provides the 
details of the latest incident is published through the INSEC website and the MAJWG. The aim of 
this document is to generate an immediate and coordinated response (victim assistance, MRE, 
marking and IEDD if necessary). 
 
Data are analysed and summarised in a bi-monthly report, which is disseminated through the 
Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG).  Casualties from victim-activated explosions, 
                                                            
18
 The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) had been collecting mine/IED casualty statistics since 1998. It relied 
on ‘passive’ surveillance of secondary sources – principally, media reports – and other organisations believed the data 
to be inaccurate.  
Kathmandu
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India
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Not yet cleared
As at 22 May 2009
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intentional explosions and, from 2010, other forms of armed violence (including small arms & 
light weapons – SALW) are reported separately. 
 
The continued violence in the Terai has led to contamination by socket bombs and similar 
devices, but on a smaller scale than during the Insurgency. There has been a worrying increase 
of incidents in recent months, along with some suggestion that the use of these devices by 
militant groups is becoming more sophisticated.     
 
The number of casualties from victim-activated explosions has been declining since 2006, but 
the number of incidents has not been falling as rapidly because smaller devices (e.g. those in the 
Terai) account for a larger share of the accidents. In 2011, half the total accidents were caused 
by ‘new’ devices (i.e. made since the CPA). 
 
Figure 3 – The most affected districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Victim-activated casualties and incidents 
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Since the CPA, only 5 per cent of accidents have been the result of landmines; almost 80 per 
cent were due to IED. Children – particularly boys between 5-19 years old – suffer the majority 
of casualties. 
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Figure 5 – Casualties by age quintile 
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About 40 per cent of all casualties are boys, followed by men (29 per cent), women (17 per cent) 
and girls (14 per cent).
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HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
MINE ACTION BEFORE THE CPA 
The first mine action activities in Nepal were initiated by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(NCBL) in 1995. It focussed initially on advocacy and awareness at the political level and with 
district officials. NCBL started data collection of victims in 1998, leading eventually to the 
admission by the Nepal Army in 2003 that it had laid landmines. 
 
In November 2004, UNICEF assumed the role of the United Nations focal point organization for 
Mine Action in Nepal. UNICEF established a national Mine Risk Education (MRE) Working Group, 
eventually comprising 16 international and national NGOs as well as the Nepal Red Cross Society 
(NRCS) and ICRC.  In 2006, the group became the Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG), 
acting as a coordination body for MRE, advocacy, victim assistance and accident/casualty 
surveillance systems. After UNMIN and UNMAS became directly involved in Nepal, the MAJWG 
also covered demining. 
 
Textbox 8 – UNICEF support to mine action in Nepal 
In 2006, UNICEF and Handicap International enlisted a local NGO – INSEC – to establish an 
enhanced surveillance system for victim-activated explosions. This provided credible evidence 
on the numbers of accidents and casualties, which confirmed both the extent of the problem 
and trends over time. 
 
Immediately after the CPA, UNICEF offered both sides of the conflict good quality, 'made in 
Nepal' hazards signs designed to international standards. Soon, UNICEF had provided 14,000 
hazard signs to mark all known mine/IED fields and storage areas. This was a rapid, practical
19
 
and cost-effective initiative that enhanced safety and reinforced the understanding among 
combatants that they had a responsibility to protect civilians from the mines and IED. 
 
In late 2008, UNICEF agreed with UNMAS to establish the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) in 
Nepal. This brought together all the organisations involved in mine action including, critically, 
the three security forces. 
 
UNICEF seized this opportunity to provide MRE training for almost 19,000 personnel in the APF 
and NP, as well as the training of almost 200 ‘master MRE trainers’ and the provision of 
improved materials.
20
 In addition to enhancing the security of NP and APF personnel, this 
provided a point-of-entry to broaden the network of MRE ‘focal points’ beyond local NGOs and 
the Red Cross to include members of the security forces. To date, 430 people have received 
supplemental training as focal points, also arranged by UNICEF. 
                                                            
19
 Fortunately, Nepalese did not steal the signs, as has been the case in some other countries. 
20
 Coordinated by UNICEF, the many organisations involved in MRE have developed a common MRE curriculum and 
use common materials. 
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MINE ACTION SINCE THE CPA 
REQUIREMENTS EMERGING FROM THE CPA  
Clear mandates for stockpile destruction and demining emerged from the CPA and subordinate 
agreements. Paragraph 5.1.4 of the CPA stated that “Both sides shall assist each other to mark 
the landmines and booby-traps used during the time of armed conflict by providing necessary 
information within 30 days and defuse and excavate it within 60 days.” 
 
Section 2 of the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) 
stated “The parties will provide maps and sketches showing current dispositions, including: 
(2) Minefields, landmines, unexploded ordnance, standard explosives, improvised explosive 
devices and exact location of such items;”21  
 
AMMAA paragraph 4.1.2 – Weapons storage and control stated “The parties agree upon the 
safe storage of all Maoist army weapons and ammunition, in the seven main cantonment areas 
under UN monitoring...Unsuitable devices will be destroyed immediately. Stable devices will be 
stored safely and under 24-hour armed guard. The parties, in consultation with the UN, will 
determine a timeline and process for the later destruction of all improvised explosive devices.”  
 
As required in the AMMAA, IEDs used by the Maoist army were collected at designated areas at 
each of the seven main cantonment sites. 
CAPACITIES PRESENT IN NEPAL 
The provisions in the CPA relating to landmines and IEDs clearly far exceeded the demining and 
EOD/IED disposal capacities extant in the country. The Nepal Army (NA) had the most capacity, 
but even it lacked the training and equipment needed to clear the minefields. 
 
Given the increasing use of IEDs during the civil war, in August 2002 the NA established the EOD 
Holding Unit, responsible for the search and disposal of IEDs. The EOD Unit included 15 
EOD/Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) teams deployed at six regional bases 
throughout the country.  
 
In December 2006 the GoN established the Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre 
(NAMACC) within the grounds of the EOD Holding Unit in Kathmandu to assume responsibility 
for ‘humanitarian demining’22 and related mine action tasks. The NA received equipment from 
the British and Swiss Governments including mine detectors and robotic equipment for bomb 
disposal.  Eight NA personnel received training in Kenya, while five NA engineers trained in 
operations management in South-Lebanon, funded through the UNPFN. 
 
The Armed Police Force (APF) and, to a lesser degree, the Nepal Police also had EOD capacity, 
but have played a secondary role in the demining programme.  
 
                                                            
21
 This is also stipulated in section 4.2.2 Commander Responsibilities. 
22
 In the mine action field, ‘humanitarian demining’ is best understood as any demining that is not for military or 
purely commercial end use. 
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Early in 2007, the GoN became an integral part of the MAJWG with NA, APF, NP and MoPR all 
participating actively. 
 
Textbox 9 – The Armed Police Force (APF) 
The APF was created in 2001 in response to the growing Maoist insurgency. During the conflict, 
it used command controlled IEDs to protect its facilities and handled many of the bomb disposal 
tasks during the insurgency. Over 200 APF personnel have had training in India or the U.S. in 
EOD/IED disposal and MRE. The APF participated in some training from the UN as well.  
 
The APF reports that it has disposed of over 3,000 devices, starting shortly after the CPA. 
However, it has never received modern mine detection and bomb disposal equipment. 
Accordingly, a policy has recently been agreed between the ministries of Home Affairs and 
Defence that the Police will contact the NA to respond to IEDs and UXO, and the APF will get 
involved only if, for some reason, the Army cannot respond in a timely manner. 
 
In 2010, UNICEF agreed a joint plan with the APF to train 75 MRE ‘master trainers’ through three 
Regional Training-of-Trainers workshops. The APF has been active in MRE since then. The 
master trainers subsequently trained thousands of APF personnel who, in turn, have delivered 
MRE in a number of communities in mine/IED-affected areas.  
 
Textbox 10 – The Nepal Police (NP) and Mine Action 
During the insurgency, NP had a special unit to emplace mines and IEDs around police facilities 
and police forces would carry explosives into conflicts. Since the CPA, the main NP mine action 
responsibility has been providing first response to reports from the public of explosive devices 
or accidents. When devices are found, police are trained to contact the Army, make the area 
safe, but avoid handling the device. 
 
The Police also have a Bomb Disposal Team; part of a larger Special Police Task Force that 
responds to a variety of assignments for which most personnel lack training. These personnel 
(700+) have received training locally or in either India or the US They are trained to defuse 
devices if the Army’s response will be delayed or if public security requires immediate action.  
 
In 2010, UNICEF agreed with NP to train 120 MRE master trainers from the 25 most affected 
districts and provide them with MRE materials. These in turn have provided MRE for their own 
personnel (over 14,000 received training and MRE materials) and for the public (c. 11,000).  
 
In a parallel development HI and UNICEF enlisted INSEC to establish its active surveillance 
system for accidents and victims (see Textbox 7). This provided credible evidence on the 
numbers of accidents and casualties, confirming both the extent and trends of the problem.  
THE UNMIN RESPONSE (2007-08) 
Security Council Resolution 1740 (2007) of 23 January 2007 established the United Nations 
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to, among other responsibilities, “…monitor the management of arms 
and armies, including the cantonment of Maoist combatants and their arms and munitions, 
including improvised explosive devices.” UNMIN immediately established a Mine Action Unit 
(MAU) to discharge some of these responsibilities.  
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The Report of the Secretary-General on Nepal’s request for UN assistance recommended the 
establishment of a MAU within UNMIN Headquarters, with the objectives to: 
• provide UNMIN with technical advice with respect to mine/IED/ERW problems 
• register and process information on explosive devices provided by the CPA Parties  
• assist in developing plans and procedures for the safe and timely destruction of all IEDs 
• conduct mine/IED/ERW related accident investigations. 
 
While the disposal of IED stocks and the clearance of Nepal Army minefields was the 
responsibility of the parties to the CPA, in view of the security risks UNMIN worked with the 
Maoist army in the management and demolition of improvised devices. The MAU undertook 
preliminary assessments of the main cantonment sites in February and March 2007, and the UN 
engaged a consultant to elaborate a concept of operations and outline a short and medium 
term strategy for mine action. The short- and medium-term objectives in the consultant’s 
report
23
 went well beyond the requirements stemming from the CPA and reflected the broad 
consensus which had emerged within the mine action community that national programmes are 
best organised as an integrated endeavour, combining the five ‘pillars’ of mine action: 
Demining; Stockpile Destruction; MRE; Victim Assistance; and Advocacy. 
 
Regardless, the initial UNMIN mine action project focused narrowly on the stockpile 
management and destruction requirements stemming from the CPA. UNMAS prepared a 
proposal to the UNPFN for a USD 1.43 million project that was approved by the UNPFN 
Executive Committee on 3 April 2007 (the first UNPFN project to be approved).  
 
To implement the project, UNOPS engaged the firm ArmorGroup in April 2007 for six months, in 
the first instance, to provide technical advice to the Maoist combatants on the safe storage and 
destruction of all ERW stored at cantonment sites. ArmorGroup first assessed all the IEDs in 
storage (over 52,000 items). Over 97 per cent of these were deemed too dangerous to store and 
were slated for destruction in a cooperative process between the Maoists and 
UNMIN/ArmorGroup.24   
 
The UNPFN-funded project was subsequently extended to 31 December 2007 (with a budget 
increase of c. USD 235,000), with provision “to address the long-term problems of landmines 
and explosive remnants of war by providing training to the NA to allow it to undertake mine 
clearance as per international humanitarian standards.” This expanded the scope of the project 
to include the demining pillar. 
 
In June 2007, the project received a second, USD 539,000 extension to train the NA in (i) 
minefield verification and mapping
25
 and (ii) MRE (expanding the project’s scope to include the 
MRE pillar), as well as to continue technical support to NA clearance teams.  
                                                            
23
 Cipière, Michel, Mine Action Support to the UN Mission in Nepal, Mar 2007. 
24
 This set of activities is well covered in Cranfield University’s evaluation of UNMAT in mid-2009, p. 11. 
25
 ArmorGroup was also to verify all minefields. In November 2007, however, NA notified the MAU that access to 
most of the minefields will not be granted due to security concerns. As a solution to this access problem, ArmorGroup 
provided training to NA personnel in minefield reconnaissance, thereby developing additional capacity within the 
Army.  
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EMERGING INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE  
Acting on advice from UN mine action personnel, the Cabinet issued a decision in July 2007 that 
established MoPR as the focal point for mine action. It also created: 
• a Mine Action Steering Committee, chaired by the Minister for Peace and 
Reconstruction with representatives from the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, 
Foreign Affairs, and Education and Sports plus observers from the CPN(M), UNMIN and 
three civil society organisations 
• a Mine Action Technical Committee, chaired by the Secretary of MoPR with members 
from Defence, Home Affairs, NA and CPN(M)  
 
However, these committees existed solely on paper for some time. The Steering Committee met 
briefly in October 2009 and the Technical Committee did not meet until early 2010. As well, the 
GoN did not initiate action to (i) draft mine action legislation, (ii) accede to the APMBC, or (iii) 
develop a strategy for the national mine action programme. In addition, the MoPR itself was 
viewed at the time as (in the words of one informant) ‘an empty shell’ – with limited capacity to 
discharge its mine action mandate. 
 
An UNMAT assessment mission in late 2007 expressed concerns that the demining programme 
remained overly centred on the security forces, with a blurring of the boundary between 
humanitarian demining and military operations. The assessment team was also critical of the 
institutional architecture, observing “It appears that the mechanism as it is now formed with a 
Steering Committee and Technical Committee in the MoPR and the NAMACC in the Army has a 
level of redundancy in the MoPR, a disconnect between the Steering Committee and its intended 
operational capacity in the NAMACC and a lack of separation between the executive level in the 
NAMACC to oversee operations and the actual implementing clearance units themselves.”
26
 It 
recommended: 
 
• That the Government should reformulate the policy level Steering Committee with a 
Committee in MoPR headed at the Ministerial level with associated Ministries 
represented at the Deputy Minister level. 
• Not to renew the Technical Committee for Mine Action within the Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction…[rather]…create a distinct mine capacity from within the Nepal Army 
engineers (currently designated as the NAMACC) dedicated to humanitarian and 
developmental activities to be formally seconded to the MoPR, and accountable to 
MoPR for the duration of operations. (Brady et al, p.23) 
 
The UNMAT assessment team also noted the weaknesses in Victim Assistance. 
 
Textbox 11 – Victim Assistance in Nepal 
While the APMBC and (even more so) the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) establish 
clear mandates for States Parties to provide a range of services (emergency treatment; medical 
care; physical rehabilitation; and psycho-social and economic reintegration) to victims of anti-
personnel landmine and cluster munitions, the mine action field has long recognised that such 
victim assistance efforts should be incorporated into broader programmes addressing the needs 
                                                            
26
 Brady et al, Report from the UN Inter-Agency Mine Action Assessment Mission to Nepal, UNMAS, 2008 
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of all those with disabilities.  
 
In Nepal, physical rehabilitation centres are supported by HI (five regional and three satellite 
centres, catering to all persons with disabilities) and ICRC (one centre in Pokhara, plus support 
to the Nepal Army Rehabilitation Centre, both open to all victims of war). Various NGOs provide 
Victim Assistance by helping mine/ERW or other victims of conflict get to one of these centres. 
 
However, as the UNMAT assessment team observed, “The lack of effective coordination [for 
disability programmes] at the government level with responsibility distributed among three 
ministries has led to major gaps in the provision of services geographically and in terms of 
covering the entire spectrum of victim assistance services.” (Brady et al, p. 19) In recognition of 
this problem, the MAJWG endorsed work by HI to prepare a Guide to Victim Assistance services 
available in Nepal, which was commissioned by UNICEF and delivered in late 2009. 
 
The recommendations from the UN assessment mission did not lead to any changes in the 
institutional architecture. Demining remained the sole responsibility of the NA and the GoN did 
not attempt to build mine action planning, coordination and oversight capacity within MoPR. 
REALIGNMENT (2009) 
The original UNMIN mandate extended to 23 January 2009 but in December 2008 Nepal 
requested a six-month extension, which the UN Security Council approved subject to a 
reduction in the size of the mission. Part of the agreed reduction was for the UN Country Team 
(UNCT) to assume the responsibility for mine action from UNMIN. UNMAS recruited a new team 
for the UNPFN-funded mine action project which, together with the mine action cell of UNICEF, 
formed the UNMAT in Nepal. With the support of the UNCT, the objective of the project was 
broadened to include more support to the government; specifically to the MoPR as the 
government focal point for mine action.  
Plans for Support for Capacity Development in NAMACC 
Working with the NA, in February 2009 UNMAT agreed a joint capacity development plan for 
NAMCC. This envisaged support for NAMACC’s vision – By 2010, the Nepalese Army Mine Action 
Coordination Centre will develop a Mine Action and IEDD capacity to International Standards – 
through the development of functional capabilities in the following areas: 
• training 
• demining operations in Nepal and as part of Peacekeeping Operations 
• survey 
• clearance 
• EOD/IEDD 
• MRE 
• Quality Management (QM) 
• Information Management27 
• Logistics/Procurement 
• Administration & Finance 
 
                                                            
27
 No concrete targets were set for Information Management. 
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Figure 6 – Capacity development challenge by function
28
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For mine/IED field operations, the plan envisaged NAMACC fielding two platoons until March 
2010, then three platoons until December 2010, and four by 2011. Until the end of 2011, 
UNMAT would be responsible for accreditation, coaching, mentoring and monitoring of 
clearance (quality assurance – (QA)) with external quality control (QC). After 2010, UNMAT 
would continue monitoring, but would reduce its presence and leave QA and QC to NAMACC. 
UNMAT would continue support for a period for fundraising, external relations, etc. 
 
The NA was also active in MRE and, more broadly, community liaison. Hundreds officers 
received full training in MRE and UNICEF provided the Army with MRE material.  
Plans for Work with MoPR 
In June 2009, funding for the “Strengthening Mine Action Activities” was approved by the Nepal 
Peace Trust Fund.  This MoPR-led project  had funds for (i) development of a mine action section 
within the MoPR, (ii) MRE, (iii) Victim Assistance, and (iv) development of quality management 
capacity within MoPR, as well as coordination of mine action activities and information and 
attendance by MoPR personnel at international mine action events.  
 
In spite of the approval of this project, progress with MoPR was slower than with NAMACC 
because, initially, the Ministry lacked a dedicated mine action unit. In October 2009 however, 
the National Steering Committee appointed a Taskforce to draft a Plan of Action for Mine Action 
under the leadership of an Under Secretary at MoPR (who then assumed responsibility for the 
mine action section within the Ministry). The Taskforce submitted the draft Plan of Action for 
2009-2011 in November 2009. This identified a number of gaps, including the lack of: 
• a strong inter-ministerial coordination system 
• a dedicated mine action unit within MoPR, as well as a plan to develop MoPR’s capacity 
to discharge its responsibility as the national focal point 
• a legal framework to clarify who controls data, quality management, and so on 
• national mine action standards 
• a centralised database that could support the work of the entire mine action community 
• adequate coordination, including for MRE and victim assistance 
                                                            
28
 Scoring was on a simple 5-point scale: 1= No evidence of relevant capacity, 2= Anecdotal evidence of capacity, 3= 
Partially developed capacity, 4=Widespread but not comprehensive evidence of capacity, 5- Fully developed capacity 
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The vision for MoPR was that, within six months, it would function as the national Mine Action 
Centre,29 with the capacity to: 
• Provide advice to Mine Action Steering Committee (MASC) and Technical Committee 
• Coordinate mine action activities to ensure coverage of areas and functions 
• Make decisions regarding implementation of mine action activities 
• Mobilise the required resources  
• Manage the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database  
• Manage QA and QC of cleared sites  
• Conduct boards of inquiry following demining accidents 
• Manage NGSS 
• Conduct post clearance survey (i.e. to assess socio-economic benefits) 
• Establish and implement a gender plan 
• Advocate for mine action with all interested parties 
• Publicise mine action activities and conduct external relations  
 
With these plans agreed to work with both MoPR (as a national MAC) and NAMACC (as the 
demining operator), the UNPFN-funded project clearly extended beyond the mandates 
stemming from the CPA, embarking explicitly on a project to ensure a sustainable capacities in 
both MoPR and NAMACC for the residual threat.  
IMPLEMENTING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (2009-2011) 
Support to the NAMACC Capacity Development Plan 
In the main, implementation of the capacity development plan with NAMACC went according to 
plan and it completed successfully by 31 December 2010. Three weeks later, NAMACC fielded its 
fourth demining platoon. Since then, mine/IED field clearance operations, as well as EOD/IEDD 
response activities, have continued successfully. The last of the 53 minefields was cleared in 
June 2011 and, by the time of the mission, only six IED fields remained. (NAMACC said these 
would be completed before May 2012.) In addition, the most recent mission by the GICHD’s 
Information Management section in November 2011 reported favourably on NAMACC’s use and 
maintenance of IMSMA for contamination and demining data.30 
 
                                                            
29
 The typical functional responsibilities of a national MAC are outlined in IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of 
a national mine action programme, available from www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-
english/list-of-imas/  
30
 Aurora Martinez, Back to Office Report – NAMACC, November 2011. 
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Figure 7 – Minefield clearance by year 
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The Nepal Army has received mine action funding both via the NPTF-funded “Strengthening 
Mine Action Activities” project (approximately USD 50,000 for vehicles in 2010-11) and through 
the regular GoN budget (approximately USD 50,000 for clearance of mine/IED fields in 2010-11). 
With the completion of the clearance of mine/IED fields, this supplementary financing for mine 
action will decline. Regardless, the Army believes it can sustain its capacity for IED disposal and 
it hopes to contribute demining and EOD/IEDD personnel for future peacekeeping operations. 
Support to MoPR Capacity  
Progress in developing capacities within MoPR was far less rapid or substantial than with 
NAMACC. One issue was the broad overlaps in the roles envisaged for NAMACC (agreed in 
February 2009) and for the mine action section in MoPR (as per the Plan of Action issued nine-
months later in November 2009). For example, both entities were to have responsibilities 
relating to information management and QM. Such overlap is not unusual: it is good practice, 
for instance, for a national operator to have its own database of contamination and demining, 
and have responsibility for ‘internal QM’, while the national mine action database
31
 and 
‘external QM’ responsibilities reside with the MAC. However, if the national authority does not 
provide policy guidance on the precise division of responsibilities, the rivalries that naturally 
exist between a MAC and an operator often lead to conflict or stalemate. 
 
In terms of developing capacity within the MoPR, stalemate is what resulted in Nepal. A mine 
action section was established in the Ministry, but it remained small and under-resourced.32 The 
Under Secretary in charge of this section did begin to chair the MAJWG (which remained the 
primary mechanism for coordination) by August 2010, but the section never sought to take 
responsibility for information management or QM, leaving these with NAMACC.  
 
A draft national mine action strategy was completed in February 2011 and approved by the 
Technical Committee, but it has not been adopted by the Steering Committee. Similarly, NTSG 
                                                            
31
 The national database might also include, for example, data on MRE activities, accidents and victims. 
32
 At the November 2010 UNPFN Meeting it was reported that a three-person Mine Action Section had been 
established in MoPR. It seems however that only two personnel – an Under-Secretary and an officer – have been 
appointed and neither of these work full time on mine action. 
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were prepared in mid-2010 and adopted by the Technical Committee, but not by the Steering 
Committee until March 2012. Mine action legislation was not even drafted.33 
 
Without responsibility for the information management and QM functions, MoPR was not in a 
position to exercise oversight of the Army’s demining activities. As well, a number of people 
expressed their concern that the MoPR now appears to have little interest in convening the 
MAJWG, which has worked so well to promote coordination among all mine action 
organisations and to bridge the gap between civilian and security sector actors.  
 
This inattention in recent months appears to stem from other demands on the time of the 
Under Secretary of the Mine Action Section, who seems to be working mainly on the World 
Bank-funded Emergency Peace Support Project. Implementation of this USD 50 million project 
has not been progressing as planned, with disbursements lagging seriously behind even the 
revised plan from June 2011. The Bank has another review planned in March 2012 to confirm 
whether the project should close in June, with almost half the grant left undisbursed.  
 
Figure 8 – Emergency Peace Support Project disbursement plans and actual disbursements
34
 
 
 
Progress in Mine Risk Education 
On the other hand, good progress continued in MRE (funded in the main, via UNICEF,35 
international NGOs, the Red Cross movement and, more recently, the NPTF). UNICEF had been 
proactive and started the MRE Working Group comprising local and international NGOs plus the 
Red Cross movement, before the CPA. With HI, it also enlisted INSEC to start ‘active’ victim 
surveillance. When UNMAS became involved to support UNMIN, it began chairing a larger 
                                                            
33
 Part of the reason for the delay was that no functioning government was in place on a number of occasions. 
34
 The graph shows disbursements in ‘Special Drawing Rights’ (SDRs – an artificial currency unit used by the 
International Monetary Fund to account for its funds, which are made-up of many different national currencies). The 
budget of SDR 31.3 million is equivalent to $50million. 
35
 Since 2004, approximately $1 million has come via UNICEF for its MRE work in Nepal. On a couple of occasions, the 
UNPFN-funded project provided some funding for MRE activities, but this has been modest. 
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coordinating committee – the MAJWG – that embraced demining and, critically, representatives 
from the three security forces. In 2011, the Department of Education became an active 
participant in the MAJWG. 
 
UNICEF seized this opportunity to provide MRE training for almost 19,000 personnel in the APF 
and NP, as well as the training of ‘master MRE trainers’ and the provision of improved 
materials.
36
 In addition to enhancing the security of NP and APF personnel, this provided a 
point-of-entry to broaden the network of MRE ‘focal points’ beyond local NGOs and the Red 
Cross to include members of the security forces. To date, 430 people have received 
supplemental training as focal points, arranged by UNICEF.  
 
Currently, there are focal points in 68 out of the 75 districts, as well as ‘global focal points’ in the 
Kathmandu headquarters of the participating organisations. This network – coordinated 
through the MAJWG – provides coverage wherever there is need for ‘emergency’ MRE, which 
provides quick response by MRE focal points to any accident or reported mine/IED.  
 
In the past two years, this responsive system has been complemented by ‘systematic’ MRE (via 
the Department of Education [DoE] plus periodic media campaigns) and community-based MRE 
(via Local Peace Committees – LPCs). For example, LPCs in 43 districts received about USD 1,900 
each to conduct 30 MRE sessions per district, with 35 people in each session. The DoE 
programme reaches even larger numbers of school-age children; the age group most at risk.  
 
Textbox 12 – Department of Education (DoE) and Systematic MRE 
Drawing on about USD 25,000 in funding per year provided by the NPTF via MoPR, plus support 
from UNICEF, the DoE has been providing MRE via schools in conflict-affected districts. Starting 
with the 20 most affected districts, DoE received materials and training for MRE master trainers 
from UNICEF. The master trainers then trained DoE resource persons who, in turn, trained over 
1,300 teachers. In 2009-10, the resource persons and teachers delivered a one period MRE 
session for each class in over 1,000 schools. This was repeated in 2010-11, in some cases 
reaching different schools.  
 
The target in 2011-12 is to reach the 30 most-affected districts, then 50 in 2012-13. In addition, 
risk education has been incorporated in the peace education curriculum for Grade 6. 
 
The direct delivery of MRE has been complemented by periodic media campaigns (seven 
national campaigns since 2007). For example, during six weeks in 2010 two MRE public service 
announcements were broadcast through television and radio stations in six languages, reaching 
millions of listeners. 
 
MRE in Nepal is seen generally as a success. The November 2011 report by an external monitor 
of the NPTF observed that a “High level of public awareness exists in mine-risk areas on mine 
threats” but that “the fear of mines has not been completely eradicated from the minds of the 
                                                            
36
 Coordinated by UNICEF and, since 2010, by the MoPR: the many organisations involved in MRE have developed a 
common MRE curriculum and use common materials. 
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people.” It recommended that the MRE programmes be continued and widened until incidences 
of explosions are significantly minimized.37 
Advocacy 
Although the UNPFN-funded project did not state that having Nepal sign the APMBC was an 
explicit objective, the plan of action issued by the Mine Action Taskforce in late 2009 did have as 
its fifth objective: Nepal to sign APMBT within a realistic timeframe as determined by the 
Government of Nepal. As well, the UN agencies and a number of the key donors to the NPTF or 
directly to mine action in Nepal clearly encouraged the GoN to sign the Convention. The UN also 
was supportive when mine action NGOs undertook advocacy initiatives.
38
 The UN also facilitated 
the attendance of Nepali officials at Meetings of States Parties and the second Review 
Conference for the APMBC in Cartagena.  
 
The Government did take steps that suggested the matter was under consideration (e.g. setting-
up taskforces to examine the issue), and a number of ministers and political parties have 
publically stated that Nepal should accede to the APMBC. However, the Army is opposed and 
various ministers have said that Nepal should not sign because India and China have not. 
 
The UN also worked hard to facilitate a high-level mission by Prince Mired of Jordan – a strong 
advocate for universalization.
39
 While the GoN initially agreed to a visit, it subsequently reversed 
this decision. Despite repeated efforts – most recently in connection with the June 2011 
ceremony to declare Nepal mine free – the GoN ultimately did not agree to the visit. 
 
The GoN’s non-adherence to the APMBC has been offset in part by the commitment to mine 
action by both sides to the conflict. The NA cleared all minefields – a noteworthy and somewhat 
paradoxical achievement given only 16 States Parties have completed their APMBC obligation to 
clear all known mined areas. From that perspective, advocacy for international humanitarian 
law has not been a complete failure as the safety of population has been improved. Similarly, 
some of the key provisions of amended Protocol II and Protocol V of the Convention of 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) are reflected in the CPA. As a result, Nepal’s current mine/ERW 
policy is in line with most CCW provisions. 
                                                            
37
 Scott Wilson Nepal Pvt. Ltd., External Monitoring of Nepal Peace Trust Fund, pp 18-19.  
38
 For example, in January 2011 the NCBL organized a workshop on the Nepal and the Mine Ban Convention, chaired 
by the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction with presentations by the three security forces, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, UNICEF, the ICBL, and NCBL. 
39
 Prince Mirad was the President of the 8
th
 Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC and, since then, has been a high-
profile advocate for universalization. 
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
NAMACC is now a capable national operator with four demining platoons that work in 
compliance with IMAS and the capacity for operational planning, information management, 
training, logistics and internal QM. Its personnel are financed through the normal budget and 
the additional costs associated with field deployments can be covered by the NPTF. The NA 
hopes to deploy demining platoons on future UN Peacekeeping Missions. 
 
Figure 9 – Current organisation chart of the NAMACC 
 
 
In addition, the EOD Holding Unit manages a number of Bomb Disposal units throughout Nepal. 
 
A number of other organisations, including the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force, have 
the capacity to deliver MRE, and the Ministry of Education is engaged in the delivery of 
‘systematic MRE’ via schools and Local Peace Committees. In addition, a number of APF 
personnel have EOD/IEDD skills, but the APF lacks adequate equipment. Regardless, the APF still 
harbours an interest in assuming the responsibility for EOD/IEDD response. 
 
There are a number of facilities to provide medical, prosthetic and physiotherapy services to 
mine/ERW victims, but victim assistance remains largely dependent on international support 
and is not yet seen as part of a broader disability assistance programme as this does not yet 
exist in Nepal.40 However, in 2010/11 the MoPR mine action section included explicit assistance 
provisions for victims of IEDs and landmines in the ‘governmental compensation guidelines for 
the victims of the conflict’. 
 
The MoPR does not have the capacity to function as a national MAC. It has no capacity in 
operations planning, information management or external QM, and gives no indication that it 
seeks to develop such capabilities. It can convene the MAJWG for coordination purposes, but it 
has not done so in recent months.  
                                                            
40
 Nepal ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in May 2010. 
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WHAT WORKED  
STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME DESIGN 
The initial mine action engagements of the UN agencies in Nepal were relevant (i.e. soundly 
conceived given the prevailing needs and opportunities) and the projects were designed 
appropriately. UNICEF began first, building on the work of NCBL which won recognition that a 
mine/IED problem had emerged in Nepal and was growing. Given the majority of the civilian 
victims in Nepal have been children, it was appropriate that UNICEF took an early leading role. 
Its decisions to enlist INSEC in ‘active’ victim surveillance (in partnership with HI) and to convene 
the MRE working group were strategic, cost-effective, and provided a firm foundation for a 
broader mine action programme when the opportunity for expansion emerged. As well, 
UNICEF’s offer to both parties to the conflict of signs to mark mine/IED hazards was a useful 
step at an opportune moment. 
 
The original UNMAS advice to UNMIN was also well-conceived and appropriately designed. The 
initial activities focussed tightly on the mandates stemming from the CPA and AMMAA. The 
decision to engage a firm to work with the Maoist forces on the IEDs held in-and-around the 
cantonments proved to be appropriate in terms of getting personnel in place very rapidly. In 
this, the availability of some funds via the UNMIN regular budget, and the quick agreement by 
UNPFN to provide additional funding, were important facilitating factors. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
In most respects – and certainly in terms of operations (stockpile management and disposal, 
demining and MRE) – implementation of UN support to mine action in Nepal went very well. 
UNMAS seized opportunities as they emerged for expanding the scope of the project – first with 
the Army (for minefield clearance and MRE) and, subsequently, with civilian authorities; 
principally, the MoPR. In this UNMAS was aided by two facilitating factors. First, the UNPFN 
proved to be rapid and flexible in approving appropriate sums for extending the IEDD/EOD 
project and for expanding its scope to capitalise on emerging opportunities.  
 
Second, UNICEF had prepared the ground well. The decisions to provide early assistance to both 
sides of the conflict (e.g. the hazards signs) and expand the MRE working group into the MAJWG 
were sound, in part because these bolstered trust and secured the active participation of the 
security forces within a broader mine action programme. 
 
With the end of the original UNMIN mandate looming, UNMAS and UNICEF decided to form the 
UNMAT. Unlike the experience in some other countries, the UNMAT mechanism worked well. 
Undoubtedly, the personalities of the individuals involved were important to this success: by all 
accounts, UNMAS and UNICEF personnel worked well together. A contributing factor, perhaps, 
was that the contamination problem was manageable and being addressed in the main by the 
Army. This meant that demining and MRE – hence UNMAS and UNICEF – were on a more equal 
footing than has often been the case.  
 
UNICEF also earned the respect it was accorded. It had laid the foundation for the UNMAT and 
its MRE activities were both successful and well-supported by the mine action actors, including 
the three security forces. Since 2011, the mine action section in MoPR has planned, initiated, 
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led, and funded the main MRE activities in Nepal by sub-contracting MRE in 30 districts through 
the Department of Education and in 43 districts through Local Peace Committees. This is the 
first GoN-driven MRE project, with minimum input from UNICEF. 
 
UNICEF personnel – both international and national – also provided continuity. One irritant to 
the UNCT was rapid turnover in the UNMAS Programme Manager position. Although the gap 
was twice filled by one of the UNMAS personnel already present in Nepal,
41
 such changeovers 
can still be disruptive and it was fortunate to have UNICEF personnel on hand who had a deep 
understanding of the mine action programme and who commanded the respect of both 
governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in mine action, including the 
security forces.  
 
For its part, UNMAS support to the capacity development efforts of NAMACC, and the Army’s 
Engineering Brigade more generally, was extremely successful. NAMACC achieved its target of 
clearing all 53 minefields some six months ahead of its deadline, and will soon complete the 
clearance of the remaining IED fields. The NA plans to maintain its four demining platoons as 
well it EOD response units, in part because the NA hopes to field demining personnel on future 
peacekeeping missions. 
 
In addition to having been effective in achieving most of the objectives, UN delivery appears to 
have been efficient. In particular, international staffing was comparatively modest (four UNMAS 
and one UNICEF), and size of the international team was reduced as milestones were attained. 
 
Figure 10 – International staffing levels
42
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The UN agencies involved in mine action also made useful inroads on gender issues. From the 
start of cooperation with the NA, UN personnel advocated that the Army include women in its 
mine action activities. A number of female deminers were, in fact, trained and at least two of 
these were promoted to site supervisor level (a captain) for demining. 
 
                                                            
41
 The Programme Officer assumed the position of Programme Manager after the incumbent departed in April 2010. 
When she departed in December 2010, the Senior Technical Advisor remained in his role until the minefield clearance 
was completed in June 2011. Thereafter, the UNICEF Mine Action Officer assumed the role of senior UNMAT officer 
until he left in December 2011. 
42
 Not depicted on the graph are breaks in the presence of the UNICEF international mine action advisor. 
The gaps were October 2009–April 2010 and from January–April 2011.   
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The mine action field has, for some time and in the main, ensured that sex and age-
disaggregated data are collected when relevant (for example, for victims and participants in 
MRE). This has been the case in Nepal as well, and the UN agencies undoubtedly deserve some 
of the credit for this. Gender and social inclusion issues are also addressed appropriately in the 
NTSG. 
WHAT DID NOT FULLY WORK 
Two of the main objectives of the UN support programme have not been achieved.43 Firstly, the 
Mine Action Section in MoPR has not developed into a civilian Mine Action Centre capable of 
coordination and oversight of a national mine action programme, including those services 
delivered by the security forces. Although the Plan of Action issued by the Mine Action 
Taskforce in late 2009 stated that MoPR would develop capacity for mine action information 
management and QM, the Ministry has not sought to do so. 
 
Secondly, the Steering Committee for Mine Action has met only rarely and has not adopted the 
national mine action strategy.  
 
There is also a concern among many representatives from UN agencies and NGOs that the 
MoPR has not been sufficiently active in terms of coordination, and that the Mine Action Section 
may not continue to convene the MAJWG.
44
 Most mine action actors continue to view the 
MAJWG as an important mechanism, in part because it provides a means for obtaining 
information that otherwise would not be forthcoming from the Army and other security forces.  
 
In addition, although it was not listed explicitly as an objective in the UN project documents,
45
 it 
is clear the UN agencies involved (UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordination Office, UNMAS, 
UNICEF) – as well as a number of key donors – hoped Nepal would sign the APMBC. They 
devoted significant efforts to make this happen through discussions in Nepal, facilitating the 
attendance of Nepalese officials in international meetings on the Convention, and trying to 
facilitate a high-level mission. In the end, and despite repeated efforts, the GoN did not agree to 
the mission and has not signed the APMBC or the other main disarmament conventions 
governing conventional weapons. 
ARE THE CAPACITIES SUSTAINABLE? 
CAPACITY GAPS 
Nepal still lacks the institutional architecture for a national mine action programme under 
civilian coordination and oversight. In addition, it has not ratified the APMBC or the other 
                                                            
43
 In a strict sense, the target to eliminate mine casualties by 2011 was not achieved, as there were two casualties 
from landmines in 2011. Regardless, all minefields have now been cleared, so this objective has been achieved for the 
future and is not discussed in this section. 
44
 It is important to note that most mine action stakeholders stated that the individual heading the Mine Action 
section in MoPR was very capable. The failure was institutional rather than individual. 
45
 The Terms of Reference for this evaluation also states on of the objectives of the programme was for “Nepal to 
comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.” Countries 
can comply (and, arguably, Nepal has done so for the main provisions) without signing or acceding to the Treaty. As 
well, the Plan of Action issued by the Mine Action Taskforce in late 2009 did have as fifth objective: Nepal to sign 
APMBT within a realistic timeframe as determined by the Government of Nepal. 
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conventional weapons disarmament conventions, or adopted mine action legislation. On the 
other hand, thanks to the efforts of the Army (especially), APF and NP, Nepal is mine-free and 
there is both the capacity and commitment to complete the clearance of the remaining IED 
fields and respond to reports of ERW/IED and accidents with both disposal and MRE assets.  
 
Given Nepal’s success in eliminating its mine problem and its capacities for MRE and EOD/IEDD 
response, does the weakness in the capacity and commitment of civilian mine action institutions 
constitute a problem? In the view of the study team, the answer is yes. Of course, this is far 
from the major problem Nepal faces at this juncture, but rectifying it would cost little and, if not 
rectified, the problems are likely to grow over time.  
 
One concern relates to information management. NAMACC has IMSMA and adequately trained 
personnel to maintain it. However, it only enters data on contamination and its own demining 
activities. INSEC continues to maintain a separate database covering both victim-activated 
explosions and casualties from intentional explosions. These data would be more securely 
maintained on IMSMA, but the Army says it has no mandate to track victims. This may be true in 
a strict sense, but the Army would have a mandate to track reports of explosive devices, 
accidents and (especially) intentional explosions, which provide essential information on 
requirements, trends and priorities for the EOD response teams. Given the on-going conflicts in 
the Terai, the importance of accurate, complete and timely data on explosive devices and 
accidents should not be undervalued. The Army could have an accident and explosive devices 
surveillance system that would produce the data on casualties as a by-product.  
 
However, even if the Army adopted this solution, the lack of civilian oversight and the recent 
dormancy of the MAJWG would mean requests for information from NAMACC might have to go 
through the Army’s chain of command; likely to prove a daunting process. This would make it 
more difficult for civilian mine action organisations to obtain the information they required for 
MRE response and victim assistance.  
 
All parties recognise that INSEC’s victim surveillance system is a temporary solution and view 
the maintenance of such a system as a government responsibility. Given the indifference on the 
part of the Army, plans are to transfer accident surveillance responsibility to the Nepal Police. 
On the surface, this makes sense. The Police are present almost everywhere, even in remote 
areas, and for many communities police constables are the governmental ‘frontline’ staff 
dealing with security issues. As well, the Police say they already collect such data. The task of 
obtaining information from them would normally be less difficult than via the Army’s chain of 
command. Unfortunately, all such information collected now by the Police is compiled and 
analysed by the Anti-Terrorism Unit. Typically, such units are not forthcoming with requests for 
data from civilian organisations, so this may not be an ideal solution in practice. 
 
UNICEF plans to continue support to mine action (chiefly, MRE) but at a reduced level.46 The 
Ministry of Education also is committed to continuing its modest programme of systematic MRE. 
Regardless, there is the reasonable concern that the MRE system could degrade from neglect 
unless some government agency takes responsibility for coordinating the many actors involved. 
                                                            
46
 From a staffing level of three full time personnel in late 2011 (two national and one international), UNICEF is 
allocating two national officers at 75% time in 2012 and 50% time in 2013. 
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The Mine Action Section in MoPR has shown some willingness to do this, but unless its overall 
role in mine action is bolstered, it is unclear how long support will last for a section focussing on 
a limited aspect of mine action. 
 
For these reasons, the appropriate institutional solution remains a Mine Action Section within 
the MoPR that reports to an inter-ministerial committee. The Section has shown willingness to 
play a coordination role for MRE, but the MoPR should seek to build its capacity to plan and 
coordinate the national mine action programme overall. However, there appears to be no 
champion within the MoPR for this role.  
 
As well, even with commitment on the part of the Ministry, some modest level of assistance 
would be required to develop the requisite capacities in, at least, Information Management and 
QM. Donors who are, for the most part, States Parties to the APMBC might well balk at 
providing more funding to a country that has spurned their previous efforts to sign the 
Convention, particularly if there is no mine action champion in MoPR who would bolster 
confidence that more assistance would lead to results.  
 
Further, given the success of the Nepal Army in clearing the mine/IED fields and maintaining a 
response capacity for EOD/IED disposal, the explosives contamination problem is now modest, 
lowering the likelihood of donor support on humanitarian grounds. 
ADDRESSING THE GAPS 
Short-term measures 
The study team recommends that the relevant UN agencies, plus the international and national 
mine action NGOs and the Red Cross movement, continue with the planned, modest support for 
mine action. In addition, the UNCT should:  
• maintain a ‘Watching Brief’ on Government commitment to mine action 
• work to embed mine action concerns and capabilities within one or (better) both of the 
following programmes: 
• Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) 
• Disability Assistance 
 
Given the modest scale of the explosives contamination in Nepal today, and with the continuing 
conflicts in parts of the country, mine action is a natural fit within both AVR and disability 
programming. As is the case elsewhere in South Asia, explosives are a weapon of choice for non-
state armed groups; indeed, the distinction between mine action and AVR seems strained given 
the nature of violence in the Terai. Mine action organisations in Nepal have developed a 
number of capabilities (e.g. an accident and victim surveillance system; nation-wide networks of 
well-trained personnel for risk education) that would be a boon to a future AVR programme. 
Conversely, AVR’s traditional strength in policy research and policy dialogue is precisely what 
the mine action community will need in the coming years to keep mine action from slipping 
entirely off the political agenda. 
 
Similarly, the linkages and common interests between the mine action and disability 
programming communities are strong. Mine action has long since recognised that assistance 
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programmes catering exclusively for victims of landmine, cluster munitions, and UXO are 
neither justified nor sustainable. At the same time, most in the mine action community endorse 
the obligations in the APMBC and the CCM to provide victim assistance. The result is that 
relatively well-funded mine action programmes often ‘jump start’ broader disability 
programmes in countries affected by conflict: organisations receive mine action funding and 
build their facilities in parts of the country which are affected by mines and ERW, but these 
facilities cater to all persons with disabilities and, eventually, become part of a national disability 
programme. 
 
Again, mine action capabilities in accident and victim surveillance, and the nation-wide 
networks of well-trained personnel for risk education, are assets for disability programmes. As 
well, the disability assistance community typically is a strong supporter of the APMBC and the 
CCM because of the strong victim assistance obligations contained in those instruments.47 A 
number of the leading international actors in disability assistance, such as ICRC and HI, are also 
active members of the mine action community. Indeed, the relative dormancy of the MoPR 
means that HI and other civil society members of the MAJWG may feel free to engage more 
actively in advocacy for Nepal to sign at least one of the principal disarmament conventions.48 
 
From the UN perspective, UNICEF is the natural choice to serve as lead agency in Nepal for mine 
action. It still has an experienced two-person mine action unit. Although the work plan is for 
them to work only 75 per cent time on mine action in 2012 and 50 per cent in 2013, their other 
duties include both disability programming and AVR. 
 
Continued oversight from the RC’s office would still be required to ensure a ‘one UN’ response 
as commitments grow to disability programmes (which is likely) and AVR programmes 
(possibly), in part because other UN agencies will assume leading roles (WHO for disability; 
UNDP/BCPR for AVR).49  
Medium-term considerations 
Once Nepal adopts a new Constitution and completes its elections, security policy is likely to be 
a priority for the new government. This could usher in security sector reform. For example, in 
most countries with a federal constitution, the responsibility for normal policing would lie with 
the provincial level. Assuming this happens in Nepal, it would create the opportunity to convert 
the Armed Police Force into the federal government’s policing service.  
 
The role of the Nepal Army would also be examined in any security policy review by a new 
government. It is possible the Army mandate will be more tightly focussed on its primary 
responsibility of national security against external threats, leaving more responsibility for 
internal security with the APF. Should reform move in that direction, there would be 
implications for which of the security services has responsibility for EOD/IEDD response.  
                                                            
47
 Nepal ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2010. 
48
 The GoN might be more comfortable signing the CCW as both China and India are High Contracting 
Parties to the CCW and Nepal’s current policy with respect to mines/ERW is consistent with the relevant 
CCW protocols.  
49
 Disabled persons comprise one of the ‘client groups’ in the new UN Development Assistance 
Framework. 
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Likely, a security policy review would also touch upon the issue of conventional weapons 
disarmament and, of course, regional security. It would then be natural to consider whether 
anti-personnel landmines are an appropriate and credible weapon system for Nepal today. 
Regardless, the issue of conventional weapons disarmament will be higher on the political 
agenda than it has been since the CPA. 
 
The likelihood of a security policy review in the medium-term adds weight to the 
recommendation that the UNCT maintain a watching brief on mine action and the opportunities 
to promote universalization of the APMBC. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
ACHIEVEMENTS IN TRANSITIONING TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
The likelihood that transition will succeed can be understood, in part at least, as a function of (i) 
capacity and (ii) the commitment.  
 
Progress in Nepal towards national ownership is depicted in Figure 11. The Nepal Army was 
highly committed from the start. It sought international assistance, developed plans for its 
capacity development, and succeeded in building significant capacity. It seems likely to sustain 
that capacity as it hopes to deploy demining units on international peacekeeping missions. 
 
MoPR started with much less commitment. At one point it did work with UN advisors to develop 
an Action Plan, which indicated areas for capacity development, but the Ministry took few steps 
to develop its own capacities (e.g. by appointing more people to the Mine Action Section or 
requesting IMSMA and information management training). 
 
The Armed Police Force had some capacity in EOD/IEDD, and has shown commitment to further 
enhance its capacities, but it has received only modest amounts of support, chiefly for MRE. 
 
Figure 11 – Capacity and Commitment in Nepal’s key mine action organs 
 
 
From this record, the following conclusions can be drawn for Nepal, which could serve as useful 
hypotheses for other case studies. 
 
• With commitment and outside support, the necessary capacities can be developed (the 
Nepal Army case) 
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• Without commitment, capacity development is unlikely to achieve much even if outside 
support is available (the MoPR case) 
• With commitment but without much outside support, capacity development is unlikely 
to achieve much (the APF case) 
KEY FACTORS  
FACILITATING FACTORS 
The Nepal case illustrates the importance of a number of factors – or clusters of factors – that 
facilitate capacity development. 
Funding 
The UNPFN proved to be rapid and flexible funding mechanism, approving the several 
extensions of the IEDD/EOD project and for expanding its scope to capitalise on emerging 
opportunities. In addition, the NPTF was able to provide adequate funding for Government units 
(Nepal Army; ministries of Education and Peace and Reconstruction). The fact that these two 
trust funds share the same governance structure meant that the necessary coordination was 
achieved more easily. 
Clear and worthwhile target 
The contamination problem was recognised as a problem by both sides to the conflict. It was 
highlighted in the CPA and, therefore, clearly aligned to the broader peace-building and 
reconstruction goals. The extent of the contamination was reasonably well defined and seen as 
manageable.  
Feasibility 
The combination of a modest problem and adequate, flexible funding, allowed UN agencies and 
their national counterparts to plan with some assurance to completion. 
Trust 
UNICEF prepared the ground well. Its decisions to provide early assistance to both sides of the 
conflict (e.g. the hazards signs) and expand the MRE Working Group into the MAJWG were 
sound, in part because these bolstered trust and secured the active participation by the security 
forces within a broader mine action programme. 
 
For its part, UNMAS restricted its role to the engagement of a commercial firm to assist both the 
Nepal Army and the Maoist forces, and expanded its presence in response to clear requests for 
additional assistance (mainly by the Army). Again, the assurance of adequate funding meant 
that UNMAS was willing to respond quickly to the invitation to expand its role. 
People 
Undoubtedly, the personalities of the individuals involved were important to success. By all 
accounts, UNMAS and UNICEF personnel worked well together. UNICEF personnel – both 
international and national – also provided continuity. 
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CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
Which factors are more than simply facilitating but, rather, are critical for success? The study 
team would point to national commitment. But that raises two inter-related questions:  
• what is the measure of success?  
• which national officials? 
 
If success is framed in terms of national capacity to achieve a clear and achievable objective 
(say, reaching impact-free status when faced with modest amounts of contamination), 
commitment by the senior officials of a national operator, acceptable to the government,50 
appears adequate.  In the case of Nepal, the Army had this commitment and the endorsement 
of the Government.
51
 
 
Conversely, if success is to be measured in terms of national ownership, a greater level of 
commitment is necessary. Commitment from the Government is critical for success. 
LESSONS LEARNT 
 
A number of lessons emerge from the Nepal programme. Most of these are not new to mine 
action or to the broader fields of post-conflict recovery and development, and need no 
elaboration other than to list them: 
• start with the local context/avoid blueprint solutions 
• do not downplay the value of good interpersonal relationships 
• continuity of key personnel is necessary as ‘institutional memory’ is never adequate 
• with commitment from national authorities/local actors, support for capacity 
development is generally successful; without such commitment, support for capacity 
development is like ‘pushing on a string’ 
• facilitating factors such as adequate and flexible funding are not sufficient to achieve 
success, but may be necessary for success 
 
The experience in Nepal also suggests two lessons specific to mine action that should be 
promoted elsewhere: 
• initiate MA before the end of the conflict – at least MRE, victim assistance and 
advocacy, plus a coordination mechanism 
• establish an accident and injury surveillance system as soon as possible 
 
Without these initiatives, the UN and other mine action stakeholders (both domestic and 
international) may not have succeeded in having mine action strongly reflected in the CPA and 
AMMAA. 
 
Another clear lesson from Nepal that deserves highlighting because it has not been the case 
everywhere: the UNMAT mechanism can work effectively. At least four factors that contributed 
were: 
                                                            
50
 In many and perhaps most mine-affected countries, commitment by a local NGO would not be endorsed by the 
national government, unless the NGO was a front for the politically-powerful (i.e. not a true NGO). 
51
 The APF had commitment, but not the Government endorsement. 
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• the willingness of each of the agencies to focus on their areas of comparative advantage 
• the relatively modest demining component coupled with a mature MRE programme 
meant the operational ‘mix’ was conducive to a collegial style of management 
• the fact that Nepal did not represent a large-scale and dire emergency in which a 
command-and-control approach to management may be necessary in the initial 
‘campaign phase’ of the programme (and which may prove difficult to transition from as 
normalcy emerges) 
• the UNHCRCO mechanism 
 
A final lesson merits mention: the strategic approach of the UN Mine Action programme for 
Nepal is appropriate for conflict and post-conflict environments.  In brief, start small with 
concrete and feasible objectives (points-of-entry), then expand the scale and scope of the 
programme as opportunities arise. Along the way, small initiatives might be started to 
encourage national authorities/local actors to raise their ambitions. Some of these ultimately 
may prove infeasible, but modest costs represent acceptable risks and the initiatives that work 
can deliver substantial benefits.52 But ‘big bets’ on initiatives that require sustained 
commitment from national authorities should be avoided in volatile situations. 
                                                            
52
 This is sometimes referred to as the ‘venture capital’ model of development. Venture capitalists make a 
portfolio of small investments in a number of start-up firms. They expect the majority of the firms will go 
bankrupt, but a few will earn substantial profits and more than repay the losses. The analogy is only 
partial. The market quickly rewards firms that introduce new goods and services for which there is 
demand. In general, the aid industry and, more broadly, governments have not proved to be as adept in 
(i) identifying ‘winners’ and, just as importantly, (ii) killing-off ‘losers’ so resources are freed for the 
successful initiatives.  
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE: KEY ISSUES TO BE COVERED IN 
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
 
1. Introduction (1 page) 
• Very brief introduction to the country (location, key socio-economic indicators, etc) 
• Origin, nature and scope of the mine/ERW contamination problem 
 
2. Overview of the National Mine Action Programme (2 pages) 
• When was the programme first established and how? 
• What international and national actors have been involved, and how has the 
programme evolved? 
• Have the UN Gender Guidelines for mine action programmes been followed?  If not, 
why? 
 
3. History of external support (5 pages) 
• Roles been played by UN agencies involved in mine action, and how these roles have 
evolved 
• Review capacity development in mine action including: 
o The core functional capabilities of a mine action programme
53
 
o Assessing capacity development needs 
o Developing a capacity development plan 
o Managing a capacity development process 
o Integration into national structures and institutions  
 
4. Current status of the National Mine Action Programme (3 pages) 
• Critically review the need for, nature and extent of capacity development in key aspects 
of mine action, including national programme management, technical capabilities, and 
both financial and organisational sustainability 
 
5. Transition to national ownership (7 pages)  
• At what point was the decision taken to transition to national ownership? How and on 
what basis was the time-line agreed? What was the reason(s) for the decision? 
• Critically assess the process of transitioning different components of a mine action 
programme from a UN-supported or managed  to nationally managed 
a. Defining and agreeing a sound estimate for the expected residual 
contamination. How is “residual contamination” defined, and on what basis? 
b. Defining and agreeing the capacities required to address the residual 
contamination over the long term 
c. Planning and implementing a transition from a UN-supported or managed 
programme to national ownership 
d. Capturing change – what plans are in place for monitoring and evaluating with 
the conclusion of UN support to national programming? How do these plans 
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relate to national programme and management and to UN accountability 
requirements? 
e. Sustainability – Are resources for mine action provided from national budgets? 
Are mine action structures embedded in national institutions? Does legislation 
underpin their legitimacy?  
• Examine issues facing more mature mine action programmes, such as: 
o The development of high-level capacities for planning and management/ 
coordination, resource mobilisation, etc. 
o Good governance of the programme, including accountability, transparency, 
equal opportunities, and responsiveness, and  
o Sustaining the programme, including local ownership and financing capacity 
(external resource mobilisation and national financing) 
 
6. Key findings and lessons learnt (2 pages)  
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ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY AND PERSONS MET 
 
Date Person Position/Organisation 
In advance of the mission 
Via 
Tele-
phone  
Stephen Robinson 
UNMAS 
Former Director, UNMAT Nepal 
Patrick Tillet 
Former Programme Officer, UNMAS New 
York 
Sunday, 29 Jan 2012 – Ted Paterson (TP) & Abigail Hartley (AH) arrive in Kathmandu 
30 Jan Team meeting – TP, AH and Prabin Chitrikar (PC) 
31 Jan 
Robert Piper 
United Nations 
Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator 
Patrick Lach Fergusson Peace-Building Advisor 
Danee Luhar 
UNICEF 
Child Protection Officer, Mine Action 
Krisha Subedi Armed Violence Monitoring Officer 
1 Feb 
Bijaya Gauttam 
INSEC 
Executive Director 
Prashannata Wasti Programme Coordinator 
2 Feb 
Bri.Gen. Dhanidas Karki 
Nepal Army 
Mine Action 
Coordination 
Centre 
(NAMACC) at 
EOD Holding 
Unit 
Director, Engineering Directorate 
Col. Krishna M. 
Neupane 
Deputy Director, Engineering Directorate 
Lt. Col. Yam P. Dhakal Commander, EOD Holding Unit 
Lt. Col. Tek J. Dhamala   
Lt. Col. Nabin Siwal Commander, Kali Prasad Battalion 
Maj. Manoj Gurung Chief of Ops, EOD Holding Unit 
Maj. Rohit Shrestha IMSMA Officer, EOD Holding Unit 
Maj. Ramjoty Bohara 
 
Capt. Roshan Thapa 
Capt. Dikshya 
Rajbhandari 
Lt. Bashu Dev Pangeni 
Bomb disposal equipment display and minefield demonstration – EOD Holding Unit 
Meghnath Sharma 
Dept. of 
Education 
Planning Officer, Programme & Budget 
Section 
Umesh Prasad Dhakal Nepal Red Cross 
Society 
Executive Director 
Krishna Hari Koirala Program Manager, Mine Action 
Jerome Fontana 
ICRC 
Deputy Head of Delegation 
Brian Veal Cooperation Delegate 
Binisha Shrestha Cooperation Officer 
3 Feb 
Shaligram Sharma MoPR 
Under Secretary (Head of Mine Action 
Management Section) 
Departure of Abigail Hartley 
Saturday-Sunday, 4-5 February 
6 Feb 
Sangay (Amina) 
Bomzan Handicap 
International 
Deputy Country Director 
Christine Smerdon Disability Coordinator 
Kiran Wagle Project Manager, Advocacy 
Juliet Wattebot O'Brien DFID Nepal Peacebuilding Adviser 
Anders Gardelin UNDSS Field Security Coordinator (FSCO) 
 d | P a g e  
 
Date Person Position/Organisation 
Ashok Rana Local Security Assistant 
7 Feb 
Purna Shova Chitrakar NCBL Coordinator 
Thakur Mohan 
Shrestha 
Armed Police 
Force (APF) 
Additional Inspector General of APF 
Ram Saran Paudel Senior Superintendent of APF 
Bhishma Prasai 
Nepal Police 
(NP) 
Additional Inspector General of Police 
Kedar Rijal 
Superintendent of Police, Special Task 
Force 
8 Feb Work on debriefing & report 
9 Feb 
Robert Piper 
United Nations 
Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator 
Patrick Fergusson Peace-Building Advisor 
Anne-Sophie LE BEUX 
Programme Specialist UN Peace Fund for 
Nepal 
Hanaa Singer 
UNICEF 
UNICEF Representative 
Danee Luhar Child Protection Officer, Mine Action 
Krisha Subedi Armed Violence Monitoring Officer 
Afrah A. Al-Ahmadi World Bank Senior Human Development Specialist 
10 
Feb 
Aleksander Micic 
UNRCPD 
Deputy Director 
Julia Knittel Associate Political Affairs Officer 
Michael Brown UNDP (PBRU) Head, Peace Building and Recovery Unit 
Departure of Ted Paterson 
Post-mission 
16 
Feb 
(via 
tele-
phone 
Stephen Robinson  Former Director, UNMAT Nepal 
Hugues Laurenge  Former Technical Advisor, UNICEF Nepal 
Justin Brady  Acting Director, UNMAS 
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ANNEX 3 – TIMELINE OF UN SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION IN NEPAL 
 
 
Other donors AusAID, DFID, ECHO, Japan, Sida 
UNPFN 
UNICEF 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
MRE 
Working 
Group 
CPA 
National 
Authority 
IED stocks 
destroyed 
MoPR 1st 
chairs 
MAJWG 
Minefield 
free 
IED field 
free 
UNMAS 
UNICEF 
VTF 
UNMIN NPTF 1 NPTF 2? 
75% 50% 
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ANNEX 4 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED 
 
UN and other Official Documents 
 
Agreement of Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, 28 Nov 2006, (accessed on 8 
Feb 2012 from 
www.carnegieendowment.org%2Fnewsletters%2FSAP%2Fpdf%2Fnepal_modalities_agreement_nov_28_final.pdf  
 
Comprehensive Peace Accord, [Full text of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement held between 
Government of Nepal and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)], accessed on 4 Feb 2012 
from http://reliefweb.int/node/219161  
 
Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007), (accessed on 8 Feb 2012 from   
www.worldstatesmen.org%2FNepal_Interim_Constitution2007.pdf)  
 
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations 
assistance in support of its peace process, S/2007/612, Jan 2007 
 
_______, Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance 
in support of its peace process, S/2009/1, Jan 2009 
 
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1740, S/RES/1740 (2007), Jan 2007 
 
_______, Resolution 1864, S/RES/1864 (2009), Jan 2009 
 
_______, Resolution 1909, S/RES/1909 (2010), Jan 2010 
 
Mine Action Documents  
 
ArmorGroup, Outline Concept Plan of Operations, April 2007 
 
Brady, Justin, Hugues Laurenge, Katrine Hoyer, Maria-Elena Arias, and Patrick Tillet, Report from 
the UN Inter-Agency Mine Action Assessment Mission to Nepal, UNMAS, Jan 2008 
 
CDC, Evaluation of UNICEF Nepal Mine Action Activities: Victim-Activated Explosion Injury 
Surveillance and Mine Risk Education, International Emergency and Refugee Health 
Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011  
 
Cipière, Michel, Mine Action Support to the United Nations Mission in Nepal, UNMAS, Mar 2007 
 
Cranfield University, Evaluation of the UN Mine Action Team in Nepal, Jun 2009 
 
Explosive Remnants of War and Landmines in Nepal: Understanding the Threat, INSEC and 
Handicap International, 2006 
 
 g 
 
Government of Nepal, National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) for Mine Action in 
Nepal, Mine Action Steering Committee/National Mine Action Technical Committee, Jul 
2010 
 
_______, Plan of Action for Mine Action (2009-2011), Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Nov 
2009 
 
NAMACC/UNMAT Capacity Development Plan, Feb 2009 
 
Nepal National Mine Action Strategy 2011-2012, Feb 2011 
 
Nepal Red Cross Society and International Committee of the Red Cross, Mine Risk Education, 
March 2012. 
 
Providing Victim Assistance in Nepal: A Handbook for Assisting Victims of Explosive Devices, 
Handicap International and UNICEF, 2009 
 
Other Documents 
 
Duncan, Debi et al, Joint Government of Nepal and Donor Review of the Nepal Peace Trust 
Fund, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction Peace Fund Secretariat and the Donor 
Advisory Group to the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, undated but 2010 
 
Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), Nepal Human Rights Yearbook: 2011, Feb 2011 
 
International Crisis Group, Nepal’s Peace Process: The Endgame Nears, Asia Briefing N° 121, Dec 
2011 
 
_______, Nepal: From Two Armies to One, Asia Report N° 211, Aug 2011 
 
_______, Nepal’s Fitful Peace Process, Asia Briefing N° 120, Apr 2011 
 
_______, Nepal’s Political Rites of Passage, Asia Report N° 194, Sep 2010  
 
_______, Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands? Asia Report N° 173, Aug 2009 
 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Country Profile: Nepal,  http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/find_profile/NP/2011 accessed 13 Nov 
2011 
 
Menon, Nidhiya and Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, War and Women’s Work: Evidence from the 
Conflict in Nepal, Policy Research Working Paper 5745, World Bank, Aug 2011 
 
Nepal Peace and Development Strategy: 2010-2015 – A contribution to development planning 
from Nepal’s international development partners, January 2011 
  
 h 
 
Organisation Development Centre, Independent External Review of the United Nations Peace 
Fund for Nepal (UNPFN), August 2011 
 
 
Ostrom, Elinor, Clark Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar and Krister Andersson, Aid, Incentives, and 
Sustainability: an Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation, Sida Studies in 
Evaluation 02/01:1, Sida, 2002 (available from http://www.sida.se/evaluation See also 
http://www.amazon.com/The-Samaritans-Dilemma-Political-
Development/dp/0199278857)  
 
Saferworld, Interdisciplinary Analysts, Nepal Madhes Foundation and Small Arms Survey, Armed 
Violence in the Terai, Aug 2011 
 
Scott Wilson Nepal Pvt. Ltd., External Monitoring of Nepal Peace Trust Fund, Nov 2011 
 
Suhkre, Astri, UN Support for Peacebuilding: Nepal as the Exceptional Case, WP 2009:7, Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, 2009 
 
Watson, Charlotte with Rebecca Crozier, Security for Whom? Security Sector Reform and Public 
Security in Nepal, International Alert, Jan 2009 
 
Wennmann, Achim, Socio-Economic Inequalities and Peace in Nepal, CCDP Working Paper 
Number 2, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), Graduate Institute 
of International and Development Studies, 2009 
 
World Bank, Implementation Status and Results, Nepal Peace Support Project, Report ISR3266, 
November 2011 
 
_______, Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Nepal Emergency Peace 
Support Project, Report No. 54421-NP, April 2010 
 
_______, Interim Strategy Note for Nepal, Report No. 38119-NEP, January 2007 
 
World Bank and DFID, Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal, 2006 
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